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Abstract 
 
Alternative approaches to estimating the effects of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on 
trade flows are discussed and evaluated critically. Recent econometric studies point 
to three results: (i) NTM restrictiveness measures based on an aggregate of ‘core’ 
NTMs are more restrictive than existing tariffs and, because of export composition 
towards agricultural products, in the aggregate, these ‘core’ NTMs limit market-
access most for low-income countries; (ii) Proxies for individual NTMs, have a 
negative effect on the volume of bilateral trade for the detailed product under 
scrutiny; (iii) harmonization of standards is trade enhancing. Case studies confirm 
several of these patterns, and also that perceived severity of NTMs varies across 
products and across destinations for a given product.   Across broadly-defined 
imports at the section level, NTMs are more restrictive than the corresponding tariffs 
with two-thirds of the AVE estimates in the 25%-50% range. Technical regulations 
and non-automatic licensing are the most used single-NTM measures and the 
restrictiveness of technical regulations increases with income per capita.  
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1. Introduction   
 
In the field of growth, the lack of robustness of cross-section studies is now well-
documented. This lack of robustness has contributed to the newer diagnostic-
oriented approach to policy reform which is suspicious of ‘best-practices’ where 
expectations are based on the traditional presumptive approach to reforms (‘we know 
how markets work and here is the list of reforms to be carried out’).1 This diagnosis in 
the field of the determinants of growth carries over to international trade policy and 
to the effects of Non-tariff Measures (NTMs2) on international trade.  Whereas, until 
recently, NTMs were mostly dominated by QRs or VERs both of which were almost 
always welfare-reducing and hence ‘actionable’, with the proliferation of NTMs, this 
clear-cut diagnosis no longer holds. As a result, it is recognized that detecting the 
effects of NTMs in view of taking policy measures to eliminate those that are purely 
protectionist (in the sense of welfare-reducing) is difficult.  The diagnosis is 
complicated by the fact that the effect of NTMs on the volume of trade (and on 
welfare) is also likely to depend on other behind-the-border (BTB) barriers to trade, 
themselves difficult to measure and to discern from NTMs (an NTM measure can be 
amplified if it is on a product also facing a significant BTB measure).  
 
This note reviews the methodologies used to detect the effects of NTMs on imports 
and offers (partial) new evidence, concentrating on measuring tariff equivalent effects 
which serve as a (partial) basis for any subsequent welfare analysis. Issues related to 
the welfare effects and to policy implications are taken up in our companion note.  
Section 2 reviews critically the different modeling approaches to measuring the 
effects of NTMs.  Section 3 reports the results from the growing number of studies 
relying on the models reviewed in section 2. These studies draw on the global 
UNCTAD NTM data base of 2002-04, but also on the rapidly growing data bases on 
various trade facilitation measures used to measure the importance of BTB. Section 4 
completes the paper with additional exploratory tabulations across products and 
across NTMs. Section 5 concludes. 
 
  
                                                   
1 The huge success of this agnostic approach is exemplified in the recent outburst of randomized 
control trials for the evaluation of projects and of aid programs. Unfortunately randomized control 
trials cannot be applied to evaluate the impact of trade policy reforms for lack of natural control 
groups.   
2 Some make a distinction between an NTM and NTB reserving the use of NTBs as a measure of 
protection. Previously most NTMs were QRs which explains why the word NTB was often used to 
encompass all non-tariff measures. It may therefore be preferable to use NTM instead of NTB to 
underline that the measure may not be necessarily welfare-reducing, but we follow tradition and will, 
at times use NTB. 
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2. Model-based Approaches to Detecting the Effects of NTMs  
 
The systematic analysis of the effects of NTMS has focused on evaluating their ad-
valorem equivalents (i.e. on tariffs that would reduce imports by the same amount as 
the NTM in question) and on their effects on the volume of trade. Two modeling 
approaches have been used in the literature. One draws estimates using the gravity 
model of trade, often focusing on the effects of NTBs on the volume of aggregate 
bilateral trade. The other, draws on the factor-endowment-based theories of trade 
focusing on the volume of trade at the product level where import volumes are 
correlated with factor endowments, country characteristics, tariffs and various 
proxies of NTBs. We review briefly each approach. 
 
 
2.1 The Gravity Approach to NTM measurement 
 
We start with the ubiquitous gravity model, most often used to examine the effects of 
NTBs. While many applications stick to the gravity equation for the volume of 
aggregate trade, the interest here is on a comparison of NTM measures at the product 
level so we formulate directly the disaggregated version (see e.g. Anderson and Van 
Wincoop, 2004 or Feenstra, 2004). Then, the volume of bilateral trade for good k 
between i and j is given by: 
 
( )ln 1 lnk kij i j ij ijX a b tσ ε= + − − +       (1) 
 
where Xkij represents the export flows of good k from country i to importer j (valued 
at cif prices), tkij represents all (gross) bilateral “trade costs”, σ  the elasticity of 
substitution for good-class k, ai and bj are country (exporter and importer) fixed 
effects that capture all characteristics that are specific to each pair (GDPs, population, 
etc...) and ijε is a normally distributed error term. The associated trade costs function 
for good k between i and j, tij, is expressed as: 
 
( )ln ln 1 ln lnk k k nij ij ij ij n ij ijt T NTM D DUMγ δ θ ν= + + + + +∑    (2) 
 
i.e. trade costs are stipulated to be a function of the tariff rate on product k imported 
by country j from i, Tkij, and of an average NTM index of importer j against exporter i, 
NTMkij, the bilateral distance between the economic center of countries i and j, Dij, 
and a set of control variables (usually dummy variables having the value of 1 if 
countries i and j share a common land border, an economic integration agreement, 
are on the same continent, or share the same primary language).  
 
Substituting (2) into (1) yields the model used to predict the effects of NTMs on the 
volume of bilateral trade. The problems start here. First, the gravity model works 
better for aggregate trade than for trade at the product-line level. This is important 
since we are mostly interested in the relative importance of various NTMs by sector of 
activity or, even better, at the product-level. Such estimates then need to be carried 
out at the product level where NTMs they differ across categories of products. For 
example, a technical regulation will imposed on chemical products but not on textiles. 
This is why the model must be specified at the disaggregated product level.  
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Second, for a given indicator, NTMkij, there is little variation in the data across 
suppliers to country j for a given product since when an importer specifies an NTM 
on a product, it is usually the same for all exporters. Thus there is (even) less bilateral 
variation in NTMs than in tariffs and this makes identification of the effects of NTMs 
much more difficult.  With very little variation in bilateral tariffs, and even less in the 
indicator of bilateral barriers, estimates will be instable, suffering from 
multicollinearity.  
 
Thus, with NTMs mostly defined multilaterally (the same barrier is applied by 
country j on its imports whomever the exporter i) and given the limited data available 
on NTMs, one can only estimate an NTM restrictiveness by importing country, not 
bilaterally, especially when using the NTMs tabulated from the WITS data base.3 
Going a step further, since the initial NTM variable is importer-specific, this 
dramatically complicates the interpretation of the estimated coefficient for the 
“bilateral” NTM variable.  To take  an example, drawn from Anderson et al. (2008) 
who use this framework, they state that “the coefficient for bilateral NTB variables 
can be interpreted as -for some given of NTBs multilaterally – the effect on a 
particular pairing of countries of being a member of some group m”.4 Moreover, there 
are further econometric problems in the data as missing values may not reflect the 
absence of an NTM on that particular tariff line.  
 
In sum, even though it has been often used (see the review of the literature below), 
the gravity equation is not very informative if one is interested to compare the effects 
of different types of NTMs on a large panel of countries at a disaggregated product 
level.  
 
2.2 The Factor-endowment-based Approach to NTM measurement 
 
Since one is interested in the effects of NTMs at the product level, is it natural to use 
as a benchmark a model that isolates the determinants of the aggregate (rather than 
bilateral) volume of product trade and then to add on the effects of tariffs and NTMs. 
This approach initiated by Leamer (1990) has been extended recently by Kee et al. 
(2009) to the estimation of NTMs.  Drawing on an earlier study (Kee et al., 2009) in 
which they estimate the elasticity of demand for imports at the HS-6 product line 
level), they estimate the quantity-impact of NTBs for good k as: 
 
( ), , , , , ,ln ln 1 r r r rk i k i k i k k i k k i k i k i k i
r r
m t C NTB C NTBε α α β β κ − + = + + + +  ∑ ∑   (3) 
 
where 
,k im  is the import value of good k in country i; 
                                                   
3 Even with a large survey (over 10,000 respondents)  such as the one designed by ECORYS in their 
study of EU/US NTBs,  Anderson et al. (2008) explain that due to a small response numbers in each 
bilateral response cell, a “higher quality measure of the degree of the perceived NTBs faced by an 
exporter in any representative country i for export to country j was obtained by averaging importer j 
responses across all exporters”. 
4 Anderson et al. (2008) are interested in the effects of NTBs in a two-region world (NAFTA and 
European Economic area). They conclude that their estimated coefficient on the NTB dummy delivers 
the “surcharge faced by EU exporters to NAFTA relative to a baseline NTB that implicitly affects all 
exporters to j alike” which is not very useful for our purpose.  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.32 
 
6 
 
kα  are tariff line dummies that capture any good-specific effect; 
,k it  is the ad-valorem tariff on good k in country i; 
,k iε  is the import demand elasticity (obtained extraneously); 
r
iC  are r country-specific variables (agricultural land on GDP, capital on GDP and 
labor on GDP for relative factor endowments and GDP for economic size, a dummy 
for island and the average distance to world markets for geography); 
,k iNTB  is a dummy variables indicating the presence of a NTB for line k imported by i; 
,k iβ  the parameter that capture the impact that the NTB imposed on good k in 
country i has on  the corresponding imports.  
 
Equation (3) is estimated at the HS-6 tariff line level. To make NTBs comparable 
between them and comparable with ad-valorem tariffs, Kee et al. transform the 
quantity impact into an ad-valorem price-equivalent (AVE) defined as 
ln /dAVE p NTB= ∂ ∂ ,  where dp  is the domestic price. They show that the ad-valorem 
equivalent (AVE) of the NTB imposed on good k by country i is given by: 
,
ˆ
,
,
1k i
k i
k i
eAVE
β
ε
−
=            (4) 
with 
,
ˆ
k iβ obtained from the estimation of (3). AVEs are then computed for each 
country at the HS-6 level and aggregated up to an aggregate measure.  
 
This method has several advantages over the gravity approach. First, it delivers 
directly the sought-after tariff-equivalent of NTBs (see (4)).  Second, suppose that one 
adds indices of trade facilitation as in e.g. Shepherd and Wilson (2008) to the NTB 
indices. Then one can compare directly the relative effects on imports of removing, 
tariffs, versus removing NTBs, and one can also compare the effects of removing the 
aggregate of NTBs and tariffs versus removing BTB measures. Third, insofar as the 
elasticity of imports is taken extraneously to the estimation, the endogeneity of 
imports is, at least, partly resolved.  
 
Once one goes beyond the traditional approach relying on coverage and frequency 
indices, this approach is likely to be more informative than the gravity-based 
approach which has dominated the evaluation of the effects of NTBs (see table 1 
below).  
 
The approach, however, also has several shortcomings. First, idiosyncratic 
measurement errors, likely to cancel out at the aggregate level, will be magnified in at 
the HS-6 product-line level. Second, it is difficult to introduce relevant control 
variables (beyond dummy variables) at the disaggregated level. Indeed, at the HS-6 
level, there is nothing else than tariffs and trade volumes. Third, the estimate of the 
price elasticity of demand for imports, which is essential for computing the AVE, will 
likely change in magnitude with the sample period.5     
 
                                                   
5 For example, textiles and clothing, subject to a large number of NTMs in the 6200 (quotas ) and 8100 
(technical regulations ) categories of NTBs, has witnessed a significant change since 2002-04 when the 
NTM  data were last collected and the price elasticity of demand for imports estimated in Kee et al. 
(forthcoming).  
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3. Econometric Estimates of the Effects of NTMs  
 
The extensive use of gravity equation in the assessment of specific NTMs is due to its 
simplicity. Since the sign of the variables that capture the effect of the NTM in the 
regression is not constrained, it is possible to also capture the trade-enhancing effect 
of regulations when they act as standards that facilitate trade. In certain cases one 
can also measure import elasticities with respect to variations in the restrictiveness of 
the standards themselves when there is some variability across countries or over time 
(e.g., the level of chemical residues, of aflatoxins, etc.). 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results from some of the studies on NTMs and BTBs (when 
these are included in an appraisal of NTMs). As indicated by the asterisks, the 
overwhelming majority of studies are based on the gravity model. The table 
distinguishes between studies that aim at capturing the effects of NTMS on all trade 
flows from those that relate to specific sectors (agriculture, electronics, etc...). Three 
relatively robust conclusions emerge. 
 
1. NTMs are more restrictive than tariffs and low income countries face more 
restrictive market access conditions. Kee et al.(2009)  and Hoekman and Nicita 
(2008)  find that NTMs generally restrict trade more than tariffs (i.e. the estimated 
AVEs are higher than the observed tariffs at the product line level).6 Because of the 
composition of trade towards agricultural products (where the aggregate of trade 
restrictions are estimated to be the highest), low-income countries face more 
restrictive market access conditions than other countries. Note however (see 
discussion in section 2 above) that the NTB restrictiveness index is an aggregate of 
the 5 ‘core’ NTMs (Technical regulations, Quantity restrictions, Monopolistic 
measure, Prices control measures and agricultural domestic support), so that it is not 
possible to know which of these NTMs is the most restrictive.  
 
2. Subject to the included controls, NTMs restrict bilateral trade volumes. The bulk 
of the studies in table 1 concern product-specific trade flows. All the studies find that 
the particular NTM/NTB proxy used has a negative impact on the volume of bilateral 
trade in the product under scrutiny. While in each case, this correlation may be 
capturing the effects of omitted variables correlated with the NTM, because all the 
studies (including several that have not been published) find systematically that 
NTMs reduce the volume of trade. For example, the studies show that the SPS and 
TBT measures in agriculture have a significantly negative impact on the EU imports 
of agricultural products.  
 
                                                   
6 This pattern would not be robust if the NTB dummy were systematically correlated positively with an 
omitted variable in which case the estimated AVE would be upward-biased. 
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Table 1.   Model-based estimates of NTBs 
 
Authors 
(year) 
NTB/NTM 
studied  
NTB/NTM proxy 
introduced in the gravity 
equation 
NTB/NTM 
database 
Products trade 
flows 
Sample  Main Results 
ALLTRADE FLOWS      
Hoekman 
and Nicita 
(2008) ** 
Non-Tariff 
Barriers 
1 variable: NTB restrictiveness 
index (OTRI-TTRI) a/ 
Kee, Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2009) 
b/ 
Total trade  flows 
(aggregated) 
104 importers 
and 115 exporters 
for the year 2006 
AVEs of NTBs are larger than corresponding 
tariffs at the HS-6 level. Other things equal, 
a 10% reduction in NTB restrictiveness 
increases import volume by 1.8%.  
 
Moenius 
(2004)* 
International 
and Country-
specific 
standards 
3 Count variables: the number of 
shared standards in year t, 
industry k between countries I 
and j, the number of country-
specific standards in the 
importing (exporting) countries. 
 
PERINORM 
database = German 
Deutsches Intitut fur 
Normung + Agence 
Francaise de 
Normalisation + 
Bristish Standards 
Intitution 
 
Trade in 471 
industries 
12 (OECD) 
countries over 
1980-1995 
Bilaterally shared standards are favorable to 
bilateral trade volumes. Country-specific 
standards of the importer reduce imports for 
agricultural products while they increase 
trade for manufacturing products 
(interpretation: standards offer valuable 
information increasing demand). 
PRODUCT-SPECIFIC TRADE FLOWS     
Disdier and 
Fontagné 
(2008)* 
EU 
authorization 
regime for 
biotech 
products 
(GMOs) 
2 dummies: one equals to 1 for 
products exported by j on with the 
EU imposes in t a moratorium 
and/or a product-specific 
measures; one equals to 1 if 
country i adopts in t a national 
safeguard measures on products 
exported by j.  
 
Agbios database 
completed with 
scrutinity of 
legislation.  
Trade flows of 
Maize, cotton and 
oilseed rape trade 
flows (HS6, 7 
tariff lines) 
19 main 
exporters 
towards 39 main 
importers over 
1994-2005 
 
EU GMO measures reduce exports of 
Argentina, Canada, US and Brazil for the 
affected products, with effects varying across 
products and complainants. Importers other 
than the EU (New Zealand, Switzerland and 
Norway) have also implemented measures 
on OGMs that negatively affect their 
imports.  
Disdier, 
Fontagné, 
and Mimouni 
(2008)* 
Sanitary and 
Phyto-
Sanitary 
(SPS) 
measures and 
Technical 
Barriers to 
trade (TBT) 
on 
3 variables: a dummy equals to 1 
if the importing country notifies 
at least one barrier; a frequency 
ratio; an ad-valorem equivalent 
of SPS and TBT. 
UNCTAD for the 
2 first variables 
and  
Kee, Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2009) 
for the third c/ 
Trade flows of 
agricultural and 
food industry 
products (HS4, 
690 tariff lines) 
183 exporters and 
154 importers, for 
2004 
SPS measures and TBTs implemented by 
OECD countries significantly reduce their 
imports of agricultural products from 
developing countries but do not affect trade 
between OECD members. European imports 
are more negatively influenced by SPS and 
TBTs than imports of other OECD countries. 
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agriculture 
Table 1. (continued)  Model-based estimates of NTBs 
 
Authors 
(year) 
NTB/NTM 
studied  
NTB/NTM proxy 
introduced in the gravity 
equation 
NTB/NTM 
database 
Products trade 
flows 
Sample  Main Results 
Otsuki, 
Wilson and 
Sewadeh 
(2001a)* 
Sanitary and 
Phyto-
Sanitary 
(SPS) 
measure on 
food: 
Aflatoxin EU 
standards  
1 variable: the maximum aflatoxin 
level imposed on food products 
import by EU members on 
countries i in 1995. 
FAO survey of 
mycotoxin 
standards on 
food and feed 
stuffs  (1995) 
Trade flows of 
“cereals” and 
“fruits, nuts and 
vegetables” 
(SITC)  
EU-15 imports 
from 9 SSA 
countries over 
1989-1998 
A 10 % reduction of maximum allowable 
level of aflatoxin in European countries 
reduces SSA exports of cereals by 11%, and 
by 4.3 % for fruits, nuts and vegetables. 
(Groundnuts are found to be highly sensitive 
to aflatoxin standards (a 13% reduction)). 
 
Otsuki, 
Wilson and 
Sewadeh 
(2001b)* 
Sanitary and 
Phyto-
Sanitary 
(SPS) on 
food: 
Aflatoxin EU 
standards  
1 variable: the maximum aflatoxin 
level imposed on groundnut 
products import by EU members 
on countries i in 1995. 
FAO survey of 
mycotoxin 
standards on 
food and feed 
stuffs  (1995) 
Trade flows of 
“groundnut oil” 
and “groundnuts 
for oilseeds” 
(SITC)  
EU-15  imports 
from 9 SSA 
countries over 
1989-1998 
A 10 % reduction of maximum allowable 
level of aflatoxin in European countries will 
lead to an 11% reduction of Sub-Saharan 
African exports of edible groundnuts, 
whereas the aflatoxin regulation appears not 
to affect trade in groundnuts for oilseed. The 
negative impact of standards increased for 
edible groundnuts and oilseeds overtime, 
reflecting more stringent requirements for 
inspection imposed in Europe. 
 
Czubala, 
Sheperd, and 
Wilson 
(2009)* 
EU products 
standards on 
textile and 
clothing 
2 Count variables: the number of 
EU standards internationally 
harmonized with the ISO 
standards and the number that 
are not 
World Bank 
EUSDB  
d/ 
Trade flows of 
clothing, fabrics 
and fibres (HS2, 
14 tariff lines) 
EU-15 imports 
from 47 SSA 
countries over 
1995-2003 
Non-harmonized standards reduce Sub-
Saharan African exports of textile and 
clothing. EU standards that are 
internationally-harmonized to ISO standards 
are less trade restricting.  
 
Portugal-
Perez, 
Reyes and 
Wilson 
(2009)* 
EU  product 
standards in 
electronics  
2 Count variables: the number of 
EU standards internationally 
harmonized with the IEC 
standards and the number that 
are not  
World Bank EU 
Electro-technical 
Standards 
Database 
(EUESDB)  
Trade in 3 
categories of 
electronic and 
related products  
EU Imports from 
131 countries 
over 1990-2006 
Internationally-harmonized European 
standards expand EU imports of electronic 
products while European standards not 
aligned with international norms have a 
lower effect on EU imports, in some cases a 
negative effect (depending on the electronic 
product considered). 
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Table 1. (end)  Model-based estimates of NTBs 
 
Authors 
(year) 
NTB/NTM 
studied  
NTB/NTM proxy 
introduced in the gravity 
equation 
NTB/NTM 
database 
Products trade 
flows 
Sample  Main Results 
Moenius 
(2006)* 
Product 
standards in 
electrical 
goods 
4 variables: a dummy equals to 1 
if countries i and j have exactly 
the same voltage + the same 3 
count variables than in Moenius 
(2004). 
Kropla (2006) for 
electricity 
specification and 
PERINORM for 
standards 
Trade in 471 
industries sorted 
into electricity 
dependent 
products or not.  
12  (OECD) 
countries over 
1980-1995 
Voltage harmonization is positively 
associated with the volume of trade in the 
selected industries. Both national and 
international standardization promotes 
trade flows in electricity-dependent products 
and, on average, electricity-dependent 
products generally benefit more from 
standardization than other manufactured 
products.  
 
Mantovani 
and 
Vancauteren 
(2003)* 
EU 
environment
al regulations 
1 variable: indicator of the 
industry k -expenditure on 
environmental protection of the 
exporting country i 
 
EUROSTAT 
compiled with 
information of 
the CEC (1998) 
Trade flows of 18 
sectors (NACE -
3d) 
EU-15 and 6 
CEEC over 1995-
1998 
A significant negative impact on trade of 
compliance costs associated with EU 
environmental standards. 
 
Notes: 
* Estimates based on a gravity-model. 
** Estimates bease on an endowment theory of trade. 
a/ difference between the tariff trade restrictiveness index (TTRI), capturing only tariffs, and the overall trade restrictiveness index (OTRI) including the effect of 
both tariff and NTMs (see Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2009). 
b/available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21085342~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,0
0.html  
c/available at http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/fontagne/data.htm  
d/available at http://go.worldbank.org/6OEYNCYSD0 and http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation from different studies (see references) 
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3. Harmonization of standards increase bilateral trade flows.  Bilaterally 
shared standards and harmonized standards, significantly increase trade or, at 
least are less trade-restricting than non-harmonized standards.  This 
intuitively plausible result is drawn from a relatively small (but growing) 
number of studies and needs further verification to acquire robustness.  
 
This said, as pointed out earlier, a major problem for virtually all the product-
specific gravity studies is that the NTM variables are always importer-specific. 
This means that country-specific effects necessary to capture time-invariant 
omitted factors that influence the volume of bilateral trade cannot be included 
in the estimation, thereby aggravating omitted-variable bias (see discussion in 
section 2.2). 7 
 
 
4. The Distribution of NTMs and of their Ad-valorem equivalents  
 
We conclude this note by examining patterns of NTMs and their average tariff 
equivalents. We draw on the estimates of Kee et al. (2009) who report the 
aggregate ad-valorem equivalent of NTMs to see if any patterns emerge when 
the NTM equivalents are extended to individual NTMs.  We also inspect the 
patterns of AVEs and tariffs across NTMs. 
 
4.1 The Distribution of NTMs  
 
We start with a description of the raw data and the distribution of NTMs at the 
tariff-line level.  According to the TRAINS classification, the NTM dummy 
used by Kee at al. (2009) includes then 4 types of NTMs at the 1-digit level 
(3000: Price control measures), 10 types at the 2-digit level (3100: 
Administrative pricing) and 153 types at the 4-digit, most disaggregated, level 
(3110: Minimum import prices. (Table A1.1 in annex 1 gives an exhaustive list 
detailing the NTMs according to these codes).8 Kee et al. sample covers NTM’s 
AVE estimates for 91 countries (including 21 HI-OECD countries) and 4,961 
HS-6 product categories (see Kee et al.’s table 3 for the list of countries and 
their corresponding average AVE of core NTB, pages 188-189).  
 
Following the TRAINS-WITS classification of NTMs, we start with a 
description of the distribution of these NTMs across HS-6 tariff lines over the 
sample of 93 countries used by Kee et al. (2009). This distribution of NTMs is 
given in table 2. Column1 give the frequency distribution when NTBs are 
defined at the 1-digit NTM code level which corresponds to the ‘core’ 
definition of the NTB variable used by Kee et al. when they estimate 
equation(3).  
 
                                                   
7 See a also in Carrère and De Melo (2009) a detailed summary of case study ’ results which 
are informative and useful, partly because they confirm some of the patterns emerging from 
the larger earlier data set where it is apparent that technical regulations represent the most 
frequent form of NTMs (see section 4). 
8 For comparison purposes, the new database under construction in the joint ITC-UNCTAD 
project should give measures for 240 NTMs for 50 countries (of which 20 would be high-
income OECD countries) by 2011. See details in Carrère and De Melo (2009). 
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At the 1-digit NTM classification level, the NTM dummy variable recorded at 
the HS-6 tariff line level then takes the value 1 when a given country imposes 
on good k at least one of the four following NTMs:  
- Prices control measures (TRAINS code 3100, 3200 and 3300); 
- Quantity restrictions (TRAINS code 6100, 6200 and 6300); 
- Monopolistic measures (TRAINS code 7100, 7200 and 7900); 
- Technical regulations (TRAINS code 8100) 
 
Table 2 shows that 74% of the HS-6 tariff lines only have one ‘core’ NTM and 
25% of the lines have two NTMs.  Moving to a more disaggregated level, the 
percentage of tariff lines with only one NTM falls, but not by much and at the 
most disaggregated level of NTM definition, 39% of the tariff lines only have 
one NTM.   
 
Table 2. Frequency Distribution of the number NTBs per HS-6 product categories 
(HS-6 products for 93 countries, over 2002-04) 
 
1-digits Freq. Percent Cum. 2-digits Freq. Percent Cum. 4-digits Freq. Percent Cum.
1 91,995 73.76 73.76 1 84,116 67.44 67.44 1 49,176 39.43 39.43
2 31,151 24.98 98.74 2 32,140 25.77 93.21 2 33,418 26.79 66.22
3 1,562 1.25 99.99 3 7,909 6.34 99.55 3 20,801 16.68 82.9
4 15 0.01 100 4 538 0.43 99.98 4 7,331 5.88 88.78
5 20 0.02 100 5 4,152 3.33 92.11
6 4,845 3.88 95.99
7 2,190 1.76 97.75
8 1,288 1.03 98.78
9 810 0.65 99.43
10 291 0.23 99.66
11 41 0.03 99.7
12 196 0.16 99.85
13 146 0.12 99.97
14 35 0.03 100
15 3 0 100
Total 124,723 100 124,723 100 124,723 100  
Each row gives the number of lines with NTBs at the defined level (for example at the2-digit 
level, 6.34% percent of HS-6 tariff lines have 3 NTBs).  
Notes: NTB Digits classification corresponds to the use of digits in the NTB data classification. 
See table A1.1 for definition of 2-digit codes and figure 2 for definition of 4-digit NTB codes. 
Following is an example of the level of detail at 1, 2 and 4 digit level for the category Price and 
control measures: 
1-digit: 3000 Price control measures 
2-digit: 3100 Administrative pricing 
4-digit  3110 Minimum import prices 
Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data 
 
 
This general lack of multiple NTMs at a disaggregated level justifies extending 
the global measure of Kee et al. to compute the AVE for each core NTB. 
Because for 74% of the AVE estimates (at the country/HS6 product level), 
there is only one underlying NTB at the 1-digit level (and then, for 26%, the 
AVE estimates includes the combined impact of at least 2 NTBs)9, then by 
merging the initial NTBs file from TRAINS-WITS (containing information on 
the different types of NTBs as described in table A1.1) with Kee et al.’s AVE 
                                                   
9 We thank the authors for giving us access to their database. 
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database10, we can isolate AVEs for each type of NTMs, for at least 74% of 
cases.11   
 
This said, to come up with a “classification” of the AVEs of different types of 
NTMs one would need to have simultaneously different types of NTMs for a 
given product line for the same importing country. This is not possible now, 
but might be possible with the new data base under construction. Then one 
could rerun the estimation of Kee et al. (2009) using dummies for each NTM 
and then one could compare the resulting estimated AVEs for a given 
country/product.  With the data currently available, this can only be done for 
26% of the data where more than one NTM is included.  
 
Pending new data, one can exploit the cross-country dimension of the sub-
sample of the 70% of observations where the estimated AVE can be linked to 
the corresponding NTB. Actually, as reported in figure 1, for a given product 
(defined at the HS6 level), all countries do not impose the same 2-digit NTB. 
Indeed, over the 4,961 HS-6 product lines, 60% face 3 different 2-digit NTMs 
across the panel and 32% 4 NTMs. Hence, there is some heterogeneity across 
countries at the HS-6 level which allows us to look for different patterns of 
restrictiveness across NTMs at the product level. 12 
 
                                                   
10 Available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21085342~pagePK:64
214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html  
11 For instance, in Kee et al.’s (2009) sample, estimates for the Brazil evidence an NTBs’s AVE 
of 1.08 for the HS6 products “320810” and of 1.02 for the product “821192”. The TRAINS-
WITS database indicates the presence of a NTB of type 6300 (Prohibitions) imposes by the 
Brazil on product “320810”, of type 8100 (Technical regulations) on product “821192”. We 
therefore attribute the Kee at al.’s AVE estimates to the corresponding NTB. However, in the 
case for instance of product “291249”, 3 NTBs are imposed by the Brazil (6100, 6300 and 
8100). Then, the corresponding AVE of 1.74 can not be decomposed in this case into each 
components of the “core” NTB dummy. 
12 This search should be prefaced by two caveats. First, the NTMs include two data bases, 
TRAIN-WITS  and the EU standard Database which does not report information  on the 
underlying “core” NTMs. Hence we cannot decompose the AVE according to the classification 
reported in table A1.1. While this represents only 0.06% of the AVE estimates reported in the 
Kee et al.’s database for non-EU countries but, since 90% of the information from that data 
base  concerns NTMs imposed by the EU, we can only are enable to analyze the underlying 
NTBs of the 38% of the AVE computed for the EU. Hence, interpretation concerning EU’s 
NTB is limited.  Second, estimates are for the years 2002-2004 with data on “core” NTBs for 
1999-2001 depending on the country (see their table 1 page 184-185 for the year per country 
in the database).  
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Figure 1. Distribution over the 93 countries of the number of different  
2-digit NTB on a HS6 product lines 
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Note: computation on the 84,116 observations having only one type of NTB 2-digits per lines, 
see table A1.1. 
Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data. 
 
 
4.2. AVE patterns for single-NTM products  
 
We stick with the 2-digit NTM classification level and restrict the sample to 
HS-6 products with a single NTM (this includes 84,116 observations, see table 
3) so that we can interpret the corresponding AVE without ambiguity.  The 
results are shown in table 3 for the 8 NTMs applied in our sample.   
 
Table 3. Frequency Distribution of single-NTM AVEs  (HS-6 products, 93 
countries, for 2002-04) 
 
AVE Tariff AVE Tariff
3100 50 0.06% 36.7% 16.9% 19.3% 14.4%
3200 0 - - - - -
3300 9 0.01% 40.6% 76.7% 15.8% 153.5%
6100 21,255 25.27% 38.1% 10.5% 33.9% 7.7%
6200 5,972 7.10% 42.6% 4.1% 32.2% 3.1%
6300 2,320 2.76% 46.4% 8.7% 20.8% 11.8%
7100 251 0.30% 39.8% 24.6% 39.9% 15.1%
7200 0 - - - - -
7900 0 - - - - -
8100 54,259 64.50% 43.3% 15.9% 25.6% 7.2%
Total 84,116 100%
2-digits
Unweighted average Import-weighted average
PercentFreq.
 
Note:  
- Computation on the 84,116 observations having only one type of NTB 2-digits per 
lines, see table A1.1. Definition of NTB codes at the 2-digit level: 
3100 Administrative pricing 6200 Quotas 
3200 Voluntary export price restraint 6300 Prohibitions 
3300 Variable charges 7100 Single channel for imports 
6100 Non-automatic licensing 8100 Technical regulations 
Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data. 
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The most frequently used NTM is “Technical regulation” (8100) followed by 
“Non-automatic licensing” (6100). Countries do not use “voluntary export 
price restraints” (3200) and use very exceptionally “variable charges” (3300) 
and “other price control measures”.13  A more detailed description is provided 
in figure 2 which shows that loss of information by aggregation is confined to 
“non-automatic licensing” (6100) and “technical regulations” (8100). 
 
Three conclusions emerge from inspecting these AVEs at the NTM level. 
 
1. The distribution of AVEs is narrow with most NTM having an AVE around 
40%. This range of estimates at the product-line is narrow and probably 
underestimates the true variance in estimates. This could be due to our using 
all estimates including those that are not statistically significant. It would be 
useful to compare ranges when more stringent criteria are imposed on the 
estimates. Also, next to prohibitions, the highest AVE estimate is for 8100.14 
Interestingly, this ranking corresponds to the subjective answers obtained 
from the interviews summarized in section 4.   
 
2. Across all NTMs, the restrictiveness of the measure on import volumes is 
greater than the corresponding tariff on that product line. Except for 
variables charges (3300), this holds regardless of the choice of weighing 
scheme.  
 
3. NTMs are associated with smaller import volumes. This is evident from a 
comparison of unweighted and import-weighted AVEs. This confirms that 
imports are endogenous to NTMs and tariffs.    
 
4. The cumulative distribution of AVE estimates (see figure 3) suggests that 
two thirds of the AVE estimates at the product line level are in the 25%-50% 
range.  
 
 
 
                                                   
13 This is not surprising since the Uruguay Round agreements generally eliminated all VERs 
(and the MFA-related quotas in 2005). 
14 Note that, as explained by Kee et al. (2009), because of the methodology used to adapt to 
the zero-one nature of each NTM, the AVE should be interpreted as the marginal contribution 
of the corresponding NTM after controlling for the tariff level. 
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Figure 2. Decomposition 2-digit NTMs into corresponding 4-digit NTM components  
(HS6 products, 93 countries, for 2002-04) 
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Note:  
- Computation on the 84,116 observations having only one type of NTB 2-digits per 
lines, see table A1.1. 
- Definition of corresponding codes: 
3110 Minimum import prices 6310 Total prohibition 
3190 Administrative pricing n.e.s. 6350 Import diversification 
3310 Variable levies 6371 Prohibition to protect human health 
3390 Variable charges n.e.s. 6374 Prohibition to protect environment 
6110 Licence with no specific ex-ante criteria 7110 States trading administration 
6160 
Licence combined with or replaced by special 
import authorization 
8111 
Product characteristics req. to protect human 
health 
6171 Prior authorization to protect human health 8120 Marking requirements 
6174 Prior authorization to protect environment 8130 Labelling requirements 
6178 Prior authorization to ensure national security 8137 Labelling requirements to ensure human safety 
6212 Allocated to exporting countries 8140 Packaging requirements 
Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative Distribution of each NTB 2-digits’ AVE 
(HS6 products, 93 countries, for 2002-04) 
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Note: Computation on the 84,116 observations having only one type of NTB 2-digits per lines, 
see table A1.1. 
Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data. 
 
 
Table 4 disaggregates the distribution of NTBs and corresponding AVEs at the 
product section level (HS1).  Several patterns appear. First, textiles (section 
11), a sector that is highly protected world-wide, simultaneously includes the 
highest number of the 3 types of NTBs: Technical regulation (8100), Quotas 
(6300) and Prohibitions (6300) with high corresponding AVEs (ranging from 
35% to 48%).15 
 
Second, the highest count for “Non-automatic licensing measures” (6100) 
applies for products of the chemicals or allied industries (section 6). This 
section is the only one including the 7 types of NTBs on its HS-6 lines.   
 
Third, machinery and mechanical appliances (section 16) face simultaneously 
some of the highest AVE about (49%) estimates for “technical regulations” 
(8100), but also of other NTMs (i.e.  for 64% for prohibitions (6300),  and 
46% for non-automatic-licensing (6100).16 
                                                   
15 The data are for 2002-2004 so they still include quotas measures on textile that have now 
been abolished. 
16 Since the NTMs are not codified continuously and since the same import elasticity applies to 
all NTMS, the variations in estimates, which are small, only capture composition effects, i.e. 
different patterns of NTMs across country-product pairs.   
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Table 4. Frequency and unweighted AVE by 2-digit NTB type by product Section  
 
(Chapter 1 - 5 ) - Section I-Live Animals; Animal Products - - 4 20% 2099 43% 19 54% 89 38% - - 4085 51%
(Chapter 6-14 ) - Section II-Vegetable Products 6 54% - - 1581 39% 29 55% 43 55% 24 31% 5374 44%
(Chapter 15 ) - Section III-Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils - - 3 104% 223 42% - - 16 55% 2 11% 736 57%
(Chapter 16 -24 ) - Section IV-Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages,  Tobacco 1 99% 1 35% 652 37% - - 45 22% 78 36% 4011 51%
(Chapter 25 -27 ) - Section V-Mineral Products - - - - 663 45% 10 22% 56 35% 56 76% 1004 44%
(Chapter 28 -38 ) - Section VI-Products of the Chemicals or Allied Industries 1 14% 1 0% 4117 34% 79 15% 108 38% 71 23% 5773 37%
(Chapter 39 - 40 ) - Section VII-Plastics and Rubber and Articles Thereof 3 3% - - 506 42% 8 43% 38 64% - - 1619 46%
(Chapter 41 - 43 ) - Section VIII-Raw Hides and Skins, Leather, Articles of animal gut - - - - 381 39% - - 7 84% - - 756 42%
(Chapter 44 -46 ) - Section IX-Wood and Articles of Wood - - - - 418 37% 2 56% 7 20% - - 761 44%
(Chapter 47 -49 ) - Section X-Pulp of wood or of other Fibrous Cellulosic Material; Paper 2 10% - - 338 33% - - 24 45% 1 32% 1271 36%
(Chapter 50 -63 ) - Section XI-Textile and Textile Articles 1 46% - - 2512 35% 5671 43% 1509 48% - - 9829 35%
(Chapter 64 -67 ) - Section XII-Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, etc. 10 44% - - 285 47% 65 25% 24 49% - - 607 41%
 (Chapter 68 -70 ) - Section XIII-Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, etc. 1 0% - - 265 37% 14 37% 16 44% - - 1046 46%
(Chapter 71 ) - Section XIV-Natural or Cultured Pearls, Precious Stones, etc. - - - - 396 22% 4 na 19 na - - 330 11%
(Chapter 72 -83 ) - Section XV-Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal 18 35% - - 1537 34% 4 38% 60 39% 1 65% 4295 43%
(Chapter 84 - 85 ) - Section XVI-Machinery and Mechanical Appliances; Electrical Eq. - - - - 2641 46% 18 50% 56 64% - - 8044 49%
(Chapter 86 - 89 ) - Section XVII-Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels, Transport Equipment 6 41% - - 1056 36% 33 27% 96 39% 3 74% 1025 38%
(Chapter 90 - 92 ) - Section XVIII-Optical, Photographic, medical Instruments - - - - 717 35% 2 59% 38 42% 1 0% 2376 42%
(Chapter 93 ) - Section XIX-Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories thereof - - - - 528 25% 13 19% 47 21% 14 20% 24 18%
(Chapter 94 - 96 ) - Section XX-Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(Chapter 97 - 98 ) - Section XXI-Works of art, Collectors' Pieces and Antiques 1 0% - - 340 49% 1 0% 22 80% - - 1293 53%
6300 7100 81003100 3300 6100 6200
 
Note: Each cell includes the number of NTBs followed by the corresponding AVE. For example, textiles have 9829 NTBs of type 81 (technical regulation) with 
an average tariff equivalent (AVE) of 35%.  
Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data. 
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Figures 4. Ad-valorem equivalent of NTMs and per capita income (4a) and 
NTM count per country (4b) 
(Simple average over HS-6 products per country, for 2002-2004) 
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Note: Computation based on 2-digit NTM classification level 
            lines: fitted values with the corresponding 95% Confidence Interval (gray area).  
Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data. 
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Figures 4 (continued). Ad-valorem equivalent of NTMs and per capita income 
(Simple average over HS-6 products per country, for 2002-2004) 
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Note: Computation based on 2-digit NTM classification level 
            lines: fitted values with the corresponding 95% Confidence Interval (gray area).  
 Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data. 
 
 
 
Finally, figure 4 checks for systematic patterns in the estimates of AVEs for 
each one of the NTMs according to per capita income level (NTM categories 
3100 and 3300 are not displayed because of few measures). The figures on the 
left-hand side (4a) plot the distribution of average AVEs per country (simple 
average over all HS-6 lines where that measure is applied) and the figures on 
the right-hand side (4b) plot the count of NTM measures per country. Where 
it is statistically significant, we report two fitted lines for both measures as a 
function of per capita GDP. 
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The following patterns emerge: 
 
1. With the exception of technical regulations (8100), AVE estimates do not 
show much variation across NTMs. This reflects the combination of the zero-
one measurement of NTMs and the common scaling by the import price 
elasticity at the product line. More precise data on NTMs would introduce 
greater dispersion in the patterns of AVEs. On the other hand, there is great 
variation in the number of NTMs per country across NTM classification. 
 
2 Single-channel for imports (7100) is an LDC NTM (with no statistical 
trend); 
 
3. The pattern for technical regulations (8100) indicates that the 
restrictiveness of these regulations increases with income per capita. As 
details in Kee et al. (2009, see equation (12) page 12), the AVE is computed 
from the estimated impact of the NTB on trade divided by the corresponding 
estimated demand elasticity. Hence, the pattern revealed in figure 4i can be 
reflect both systematic changes in elasticity estimates across income groups 
(for example a high import demand elasticity estimate for low-income 
countries and a lower – in absolute value - import demand elasticity estimate 
for high-income countries) and/or, for a given demand elasticity, more 
restrictive technical regulations (with a stronger negative impact on trade) in 
high-income countries. In figure 5 we report the evolution of the import 
demand elasticity with per capita GDP on the sub-sample of imports facing 
technical regulation (exactly same sub-sample than figures 4i and 4j).  It 
seems then that the pattern revealed in figure 4i actually reflects more trade 
restrictive technical regulations in high income countries rather than 
difference in import demand elasticities.   
 
Figure 5. Estimated demand elasticity for imports facing technical regulations (8100) 
(Simple average over HS-6 products per country, for 2002-2004) 
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Note: Computation based on the same sub-sample than figures 4i and 4j. 
            lines: fitted values with the corresponding 95% Confidence Interval (gray area).  
Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data. 
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5. Conclusions   
 
The combination of case studies with econometric estimates provides a better 
understanding of the complexity and variety of NTMs and of their effects 
restrictiveness on trade. This paper has surveyed the state of understanding 
prior to the launch of major joint effort by UNCTAD and ITC to extend 
systematically the collection of official data along the lines in TRAINS-WITS 
combined with extensive interviews of exporting companies.  
 
Perceptions gathered through interviews suggest that for developing countries 
certification requirements are important regardless of destination while 
customs formalities are perceived as a more important barrier to trade in 
Africa than in other regions. For exports destined to high-income countries, 
testing requirements represent an important obstacle for exporters.  Not 
surprisingly, NTMS are also perceived to be particularly costly for agricultural 
products because of the variety of SPS standards across countries and of high 
costs of compliance costs related to certification. For many low-income 
countries, barriers to trade are also high at home, notably with respect to 
certification as the necessary infrastructure to carry out certification is often 
lacking. Interviews also suggest that arbitrariness and non-transparency 
plague exporters to developing countries’ destination, be it with respect to 
customs procedures or product standards. Rules of Origin are often perceived 
as a significant barrier when exports are towards the EU, US or Japan. 
 
The growing number of econometric studies appears to be leading to several 
stylized patterns.  The paper suggests three. First, NTMs are more restrictive 
than tariffs and low income countries face more restrictive market access 
conditions. Second, subject to the included controls, NTMs restrict bilateral 
trade volumes. Third, harmonization of standards increase bilateral trade 
flows.  
 
Across broadly-defined imports at the section level, NTMs are more restrictive 
than the corresponding tariffs with two-thirds of the AVE estimates in the 
25%-50% range. Technical regulations and non-automatic licensing are the 
most used single-NTM measures and the restrictiveness of technical 
regulations increases with income per capita.  
 
 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.32 
 
23 
 
References 
 
Anderson J., Bergstrand J., Egger P., and J. Francois. 2008. “Non-Tariff 
Barrier Study Methodology”, ECORYS mimeo.   
 
Anderson J. and E. Van Wincoop. 2004. “Trade Costs”. Journal of Economic 
Literature 42, 691-751. 
 
Carrère and De Melo.2009. “Non-Tariff Measures: What do we Know, What 
should be Done?”. World Bank Mimeo. 
 
Czubala W., Shepherd B., and J. Wilson. 2009. “Help or Hindrance? The 
Impact of Harmonized Standards on African Exports”. Journal of African 
economies, March, pp. 1-35. 
 
Disdier A-C, Fontagné L. and M. Mimouni. 2008. “The Impact of Regulation 
on Agricultural Trade : Evidence From the SPS and TBT Agreements”. 
American Agricultural Economics Association 90(2), pp. 336-350. 
 
Disdier A-C and L. Fontagné. 2008. “Trade Impact of European Measures on 
GMOs Condemned by the WTO Panel”.  CEPII mimeo.  
 
Feenstra R. 2004. Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, 
Princeton University Pres, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Hoekman B. and A. Nicita. 2008. “Trade Policy, Trade Costs and Developing 
Country Trade”. Policy Research Working Paper, N°4797. 
 
Kee, H.L., Nicita, A. and Olarreaga, M. (forthcoming). “Import demand 
elasticities and trade distortions”, Review of Economics and Statistics. 
 
Kee, H. L., Nicita A. and M. Olarreaga (2009), “Estimating Trade 
Restrictiveness Indices”.  Economic Journal 119, 172:199. 
 
Leamer, E. 1990. “Latin America as a target of trade barriers erected by the 
major developed countries in 1983”, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 
32(2) : 337-368 
 
Mantovani A. and M. Vancauteren. 2003. “The Harmonization of Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Innovation and Export Behavior: Theory with an 
Application to EU data”. Mimeo. 
 
Moenius, J. 2004. “Information Versus Product Adaptation: The Role of 
Standards in Trade”. International Business and Markets Research Center 
Working Paper, Northwestern University. 
 
Moenius, J. 2006. “Do National Standards Hinder or Promote Trade in 
Electrical Products?” IEC Centenary Challenge 2006, 
http://www.iec.ch/academia/papers/moenius.pdf 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.32 
 
24 
 
Otsuki, T., J.S. Wilson, and M. Sewadeh. 2001a. “Saving Two in a Billion: A 
Case Study to Quantify the Trade Effect of European Food Safety Standards in 
African Exports.” Working paper, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 
Otsuki, T., J.S. Wilson, and M. Sewadeh. 2001b. “What price precaution? 
European harmonisation of aflatoxin regulations and African groundnut 
exports”, European Review of Agriculture Economics,  Vol 28 (3) pp.263-
284. 
 
Portugal-Perez A., Reyes J-D and J. Wilson. 2009. “Beyond the Information 
Tecnology Agreement: Harmonization of Standards and Trade in Electronics”. 
Policy Research Working Paper, N°4916. 
 
Shepherd B. and J.S. Wilson. 2008. “Trade Facilitation in ASEAN Member 
Countries: Measuring Progress and Assessing Priorities”, WB Policy Research 
Working Paper 4615 
 
 
 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.32 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXES TO 
 
 
NOTES ON DETECTING THE EFFECTS OF NON TARIFF 
MEASURES  
 
By 
 
 
Céline Carrère 
and 
Jaime de Melo 
 
Annex 1.  
UNCTAD trains Coding System of NTMs included in the Kee et al.(2009)’s 
sample 
Annex 2. 
Distribution of NTMs over products/sector 
 
 
 
 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.32 
 
26 
 
 Annex 1.  
Table A1.1. TRAINS Classification for NTBs included in the Kee et al.(2009)’s sample 
1-digit 2-digits 4-digits NTM description
3000 Price control measures
3100 Administrative pricing
3110 Minimum import prices
3190 Administrative pricing n.e.s.
3200 Voluntary export price restraint
3300 Variable charges
3310 Variable levies
3320 Variable components
3330 Compensatory elements
3340 Flexible import fees
3390 Variable charges n.e.s.
6000 Quantity control measures
6100 Non-automatic licensing
6110 Licence with no specific ex-ante criteria
6120 Licence for selected purchasers
6130 License for specified use
6131 Linked with export trade
6132 For purposes other than exports
6140 Licence linked with local production
6141 Purchase of local goods
6142 Local content requirement
6143 Barter or counter trade
6150 Licence linked with non-official foreign exchange
6151 External foreign exchange
6152 Importers' own foreign exchange
6160 Licence combined with or replaced by special import authorization
6170 Prior authorization for sensitive product categories
6171 Prior authorization to protect human health
6172 Prior authorization to protect animal health and life
6173 Prior authorization to protect plant health
6174 Prior authorization to protect environment
6175 Prior authorization to protect wildlife
6176 Prior authorization to control drug abuse
6177 Prior authorization to ensure human safety
6178 Prior authorization to ensure national security
6179 Prior authorization for purposes n.e.s.
6180 License or political reasons
6190 Non-automatic licensing n.e.s.
6200 Quotas
6210 Global quotas
6211 Unallocated
6212 Allocated to exporting countries
6220 Bilateral quotas
6230 Seasonal quotas
6240 Quotas linked with export performance
6250 Quotas linked with purchase of local goods
6270 Quotas for sensitive product categories
6271 Quotas to protect human health
6272 Quotas to protect animal health and life
6273 Quotas to protect plant health
6274 Quotas to protect environment
6275 Quotas to protect wildlife
6276 Quotas to control drug abuse
6277 Quotas to ensure human safety
6278 Quotas to ensure national security
6279 Quotas for purposes n.e.s.
6280 Quotas for political reasons
6290 Quotas n.e.s.  
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Table A1.1 (c’d). TRAINS Classification for NTBs included in the Kee et al.(2009)’s sample 
1-digit 2-digits 4-digits NTM description
6300 Prohibitions
6310 Total prohibition
6320 Suspension of issuance of licences
6330 Seasonal prohibition
6340 Temporary prohibition
6350 Import diversification
6370 Prohibition for sensitive product categories
6371 Prohibition to protect human health
6372 Prohibition to protect animal health and life
6373 Prohibition to protect plant health
6374 Prohibition to protect environment
6375 Prohibition to protect wildlife
6376 Prohibition to control drug abuse
6377 Prohibition to ensure human safety
6378 Prohibition to ensure national security
6379 Prohibition for purposes n.e.s.
6380 Prohibition for political reasons (embargo)
6390 Prohibitions n.e.s.
7000 Monopolistic measures
7100 Single channel for imports
7110 States trading administration
7120 Sole importing agency
7170 Single channel for imports for sensitive product categories
7171 Single channel for imports to protect human health
7172 Single channel for imports to protect animal health and life
7173 Single channel for imports to protect plant health
7174 Single channel for imports to protect environment
7175 Single channel for imports to protect wildlife
7176 Single channel for imports to control drug abuse
7177 Single channel for imports to ensure human safety
7178 Single channel for imports to ensure national security
7179 Single channel for imports for purposes n.e.s.
7200 Compulsory national services
7210 Compulsory national insurance
7220 Compulsory national transport
7900 Monopolistic measures n.e.s.
8000 Technical measures
8100 Technical regulations
8110 Product characteristics requirements
8111 Product characteristics req. to protect human health
8112 Product characteristics req. to protect animal health and life
8113 Product characteristics req. to protect plant health
8114 Product characteristics req. to protect environment
8115 Product characteristics req. to protect wildlife
8116 Product characteristics req. to control drug abuse
8117 Product characteristics req. to ensure safety
8118 Product characteristics req. to ensure national security
8119 Product characteristics req. for purposes n.e.s.
8120 Marking requirements
8121 Marking requirements to protect human health
8122 Marking requirements to protect animal health and life
8123 Marking requirements to protect plant health
8124 Marking requirements to protect environment  
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Table A1.1(c’d). TRAINS Classification for NTBs included in the Kee et al.(2009)’s sample 
1-digit 2-digits 4-digits NTM description
8125 Marking requirements to protect wildlife
8126 Marking requirements to control drug abuse
8127 Marking requirements to ensure human safety
8128 Marking requirements to ensure national security
8129 Marking requirements for purposes n.e.s.
8130 Labelling requirements
8131 Labelling requirements to protect human health
8132 Labelling requirements to protect animal health and life
8133 Labelling requirements to protect plant health
8134 Labelling requirements to protect environment
8135 Labelling requirements to protect wildlife
8136 Labelling requirements to control dug abuse
8137 Labelling requirements to ensure human safety
8138 Labelling requirements to ensure national security
8139 Labelling requirements for purposes n.e.s.
8140 Packaging requirements
8141 Packaging requirements to protect
8142 Packaging requirements to protect
8143 Packaging requirements to protect
8144 Packaging requirements to protect
8145 Packaging requirements to protect
8146 Packaging requirements to protect
8147 Packaging requirements to protect
8148 Packaging requirements to protect
8149 Packaging requirements to protect
8150 Testing, inspection and quarantine requirements
8151 Testing, inspection etc. req. to protect human health
8152 Testing, inspection etc. req. to protect animal health and life
8153 Testing, inspection etc. req. to protect plant health
8154 Testing, inspection etc. req. to protect environment
8155 Testing, inspection etc. req. to protect wildlife
8156 Testing, inspection etc. req. to control drug abuse
8157 Testing, inspection etc. req. to ensure human safety
8158 Testing, inspection etc. req. to ensure national security
8159 Testing, inspection etc. req. for purposes n.e.s.
8160 Information requirements
8161 Information requirements to protect human health
8162 Information requirements to protect animal health and life
8163 Information requirements to protect plant health
8164 Information requirements to protect environment
8165 Information requirements to protect wildlife
8166 Information requirements to control drug abuse
8167 Information requirements ensure human safety
8168 Information requirements to ensure national security
8169 Information requirements for purposes n.e.s.
8170 Requirement relative to transit
8180 Requirement to pass through specified customs
8190 Technical regulations n.e.s.
8191 Technical regulations nes. to protect human health
8192 Technical regulations nes. to protect animal health and life
8193 Technical regulations nes. to protect plant health
8194 Technical regulations nes. to protect environment
8195 Technical regulations nes. to protect wildlife
8196 Technical regulations nes. to control drug abuse
8197 Technical regulations nes. to ensure human safety
8198 Technical regulations nes. to ensure national security
8199 Technical regulations nes. for purposes n.e.s.  
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Annex 2 
Figure A2.1. Distribution of each NTB 2-digits’ AVE over the HS6 products 
(unweighted and weighted average on the 93 countries, for 2002-04) 
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Note: Median AVE in red. 
Source: authors’ computations based on Kee et al. (2009) and TRAINS-WITS data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
